

And the relation $>$ has the same sort of logical properties as that of class-inclusion. Wherever the logical properties of a relation or set of relations can be clearly recognised, and seem to justify an inference, we can make the inference; and it is a matter of perfect indifference whether the relation itself be or be not a logical relation. The desire to reduce every argument to a syllogism depends on two equally baseless superstitions: (a) that only logical relations have logical properties, and (b) that no logical relation except that of class-inclusion has the logical properties needed for inference. But, granting all this, I believe that the cases where we can 'determine a conclusion from a system of' (non-logical) relations which, in the moment of determination, is apprehended as making it inevitable' are comparatively few and simple. Prof. Bosanquet admits and asserts that we do not, as a rule, 'read off' the connexions simply from the partial system under investigation. We have to view it in the light of our knowledge of the make-up of nature as a whole. But exactly how that knowledge arose and exactly how it operates in a given case he does not in detail tell us. To me it seems clear that it is *not* 'apprehended in the moment of determination,' but is 'borrowed' from the past researches of ourselves and our scientific ancestors; and that we do not 'read off' our results by merely gazing at it and our partial system, but reach them by definite processes of deductive reasoning, which, though not syllogistic, rest upon formal principles that can be elicited and stated.

C. D. BROAD.

The Intuitive Basis of Knowledge. By N. O. LOSSKY. Authorised translation by NATHALIE A. DUDDINGTON, M.A. Preface by Prof. G. DAWES HICKS. Macmillan. Pp. xxix, 420.

THE translation of this important work of a distinguished Russian realist has been ably performed by Mrs. Duddington, and Prof. Dawes Hicks supplies an appreciative, though critical, introduction. The sole faults that can be found with the translation are in connexion with certain chemical terms. On pp. 74 and 297, where Prof. Lossky is made to speak of *chlorate*, I think it is pretty certain that *chloride* is meant. And on the latter page the expression *sulphurate of calcium* is used for what an English chemist would call *calcium sulphate*.

In the Introduction it is pointed out that, whilst we are most of us realists (at least as regards the material world) in ordinary life, philosophic study in most cases leads to something very much like subjective idealism or pure agnosticism. It is suggested that this is because philosophers, in studying knowledge, have usually taken over in an uncritical way categories like substance, cause, etc., which they daily use successfully in dealing with the material world, and have tried to force the relation between minds and their objects into these moulds. This accusation is made more detailed in the first

two chapters which deal respectively with Pre-Kantian Empiricism and Pre-Kantian Rationalism. The cognitive relation tends to be confused with the causal relation, and, again, with that of a substance to its states. The result is that all that we know is held to be the states of our own minds. External bodies and other minds are known only by precarious inferences, and Prof. Lossky has no difficulty in showing that such arguments are indefensible on purely empiricist principles even as a ground for probability.

It seems to me unfortunate that Prof. Lossky is apparently wholly unacquainted with the work that has been done in the last ten years or so in England and America. If he had been he would know that there are many writers who quite clearly recognise (a) that the cognitive relation is *sui generis*, and that the mere fact that so and so is an object to a mind does not imply that it is a state of that mind, in the sense in which the act of knowing it is a state, and (b) regard it as perfectly possible that the only causal relation between the external world and the mind in an act of knowledge is that processes in the former cause the latter to attend at a given moment to a certain part of the former. And yet many of these writers, after drawing these distinctions and recognising this possibility, still find grave difficulties in supposing that the objects of which the mind is directly aware are *in fact* physical parts of the external world or *in fact* existentially independent of the mind which is aware of them. I am not discussing whether these persons are right or wrong, but simply suggesting that, as they *do* recognise the distinctions which Prof. Lossky truly says that most empiricists overlooked, and as they are persons of fair acuteness, it is probable that difficulties about our knowledge of the external world cannot be *wholly* due to the confusions to which our author ascribes them.

The main result of the second chapter is this. Rationalists and empiricists agree in finding no difficulty about our knowledge of our own minds and their states. And the reason is that here our knowledge is supposed to be direct and immediate instead of through representative ideas. Might it not be worth while to try whether the same view would not work equally well for our knowledge of objects other than our minds and their states? This is what Prof. Lossky means by the intuitional theory, and he proceeds to give a sketch of it in the next chapter. I need scarcely tell the readers of *MIND*, that the general programme is not dangerously revolutionary, whatever we may think of the details. The following is, I hope, a fair sketch of the contents of cap. iii. One part of any act of knowledge is the object known; but there is always another part, and this is the act of comparing this object with and distinguishing it from some other experience. (By *experience* I suppose that *experienced object* is meant, for Prof. Lossky says: 'I contend that the experience . . . compared is the object apprehended,' p. 80.) Among experienced objects we must distinguish those which are mine, and those which are merely given to me. The latter include not only sensibilia, such as sounds, coloured patches,

etc., but also organic sensations (*cf.* Prof. Laird's views), and certain desires, *e.g.*, those which are treated under the head of uncontrollable impulses or fixed ideas. But in every experience, whether the object be mine or be merely given to me, there is a factor which is mine, *viz.*, the act of attending to the object given to me. In knowledge of the external world the object is transcendent, in the sense that it is not a state or part of the knowing subject, but is immanent in the sense that it (and not merely some copy, correlate, or other representative of it) is a part of the cognitive state.

As regards this doctrine there are two things to be said. First, it seems doubtful whether the relation of part and whole is a very fortunate analogy to the relation of an object known to the knowing of it. But, although the phrase is an unfortunate one, I think that Prof. Lossky's meaning is clear and sensible enough, and that he is not led astray by the irrelevant implications of his analogy. Secondly, if the doctrine is to be plausible, it will be necessary to enter into a great many subtleties and to draw a great many distinctions which Prof. Lossky does not, in this work at least, mention. It will, *e.g.*, be necessary to distinguish between knowledge of acquaintance and knowledge by description; otherwise we shall end in the morass to which this doctrine, when combined with too simple a faith in the guidance of common linguistic forms, led Meinong and his very able and courageous pupils.

Prof. Lossky holds that the standard arguments for the subjectivity of sensibilia only prove that they depend on and belong to the body, not that they are states or parts of the self. Once this is grasped it is a matter of comparative indifference to epistemology how much we ascribe to the body and how much to external objects. The general principle is that unless the necessary and sufficient conditions for apprehending a certain factor are known to lie in the body that factor must be assumed to belong to an object outside the body. Probably even sounds and colours are not purely intra-corporeal. I must confess that I do not find this theory clear or satisfactory. Prof. Lossky speaks of such objects as *sensations*, but there is no doubt that he is referring to *sensibilia*, and there is no ambiguity in his language so far. But he does speak of the 'content of the sensations' (p. 74) as being a process, and then raises the question: Where is this process going on, in my body or in external bodies? Now, I do not see that sounds and colours are processes at all, though of course the conditions of our becoming aware of them may be processes, and even the conditions of their existence may be processes. Once it is seen (a) that a coloured patch is not a process and (b) that we must distinguish the questions (i) What process conditions my awareness of this patch? and (ii) Does any process (and, if so, what) condition the existence of the patch? the elegant simplicity of Prof. Lossky's theory vanishes. *E.g.*, I am aware of a red patch and hold that I am seeing a red external object. I am right if there really is an object outside my body and if it really is red, and

it does not matter though the process that makes me aware of the patch be wholly in my own body. On the other hand, if all that is going on is a certain process in colourless atoms, I am wrong, even though this process goes on in the body to which I ascribe the red colour. The really important question about sensible qualities like green is: Is *any* physical object literally green in the sense in which all unsophisticated persons at all times, and all philosophers at most times, assert that grass is green? If external physical objects be not green in *this* sense no reference to my body will save the physical reality of greenness; for there is not the least reason to think that, though grass is not really green, my body or some part of it really is green in the sense in which I wrongly suppose grass to be so whenever I perceive grass. If these external objects such as grass be not really green, Prof. Lossky will be faced with the question: What sort of objects are green? Since he cannot answer that his own body is green, and since it is as certain that *something* is green as that we are aware of green patches, he will be forced to allow the existence of objects which are not physical and are green. (I am not for a moment asserting that in fact colours are not physically real. I think that the arguments to prove this are weak to the last degree. But I do assert that if Prof. Lossky allows *any* weight to such arguments, as he seems inclined to do, the distinction between his own and external bodies will not help him.

Finally it is pointed out that the intuitional theory must not be confined to our knowledge of particulars. We know many objects directly which we cannot know by our senses. This, we shall see later, has an important bearing on induction.

The two remaining chapters of Part I. are devoted to a criticism of Kant and his successors. They contain many excellent but no very novel observations. Kant is blamed, justly it seems to me, for overlooking the objectivity, in the sense of law-abidingness, of inner phenomena. This criticism has been excellently put in England by Mr. Balfour. Similarly he is blamed for failing to see that there is something more in externality to the self than objectivity, in the sense of obedience to law, and for failing to show in the least how our belief in any particular law is ever justified. In fact Kant took over the traditional empiricism and the traditional rationalism, and his main merit is in the highly original structure which he built on these commonplace foundations.

Part II. consists of a much more detailed exposition of the intuitional theory already sketched in Part I. Knowledge consists in comparison of one experienced object with others. (I take it that Prof. Lossky holds that being experienced is not the same as being discriminated, but is a precondition of it. This is the view that Prof. Dawes Hicks takes of his meaning, and is apparently his main point of difference from Lossky.) Judgment is thus the progressive differentiation of an originally vague subject. The

whole, which thus forms the ultimate subject of any judgment, is always before the mind just as it is in nature; the work of judgment is just the recognition of details and of their relations to each other within this whole. The S's and P's of logic are certain groups discriminated within such a whole. So long as you really confine yourself to the given whole you cannot go wrong; you cannot create anything by the act of judgment or find anything that is not there. False judgments arise through the unconscious addition of a subjective factor to the given whole. "Subjective" does not of course simply mean "non-external to the self," for we can and do make true judgments about ourselves and their states.

When thought out this theory does not seem to me to carry us very far. Lossky, *e.g.*, counts an *idée fixe* as non-subjective (p. 86). Suppose then that I erroneously believe that some one is trying to poison me, and suppose that the cause of this belief is that I have a fixed idea of persecution. I add nothing subjective, in Lossky's sense, to the whole which is the real subject of my judgment. Since then I can (a) judge truly when the whole content is subjective in his sense, *viz.*, in introspection, and (b) can judge falsely when what is added is not subjective in his sense, *viz.*, when I am deceived by a fixed idea, the important factor in false judgment must be the *addition* and not the *subjectivity*, or at best subjectivity must be involved in some sense that he has not clearly defined. Now it is a mere platitude to say that when we judge falsely we add something which is not really present in what we judge about, and it is equally platitudinous to say that this addition is in *some sense* subjective. Of course it is; all mistakes are some one's mistakes and do not belong to the objects judged about. But the really important questions are: What precisely is before our minds when we make a false judgment; how is the whole which is actually before our minds related to that to which we claim to be referring; and, if both be in some sense before our minds, how do we come to assert of one which is in fact only true of the other? I cannot see that the least light is thrown on these questions by our author.

In cap. vii. it is asserted that all true judgments are necessary. Those to which this property is usually confined are simply judgments where the necessity of P can be seen from the explicitly analysed features of S. But the necessity is really present and the same everywhere if the judgment be true. This statement seems to me to be either true but trivial, or important but highly doubtful. Take his example: This rose is withered. Since a complete analysis of the whole characterised as 'this rose' does reveal the attribute of being withered this attribute is necessarily connected with this whole in the perfectly trivial sense that any whole that did not contain the attribute of being withered could not be *this* whole, however much it otherwise resembled it. This, however, is not apparently the sense in which Lossky wishes his statement to be understood, for he goes on to say (p. 265) that 'if

we could trace the structure of all the tissues . . . and all the physical processes in them, the ground of the predicate would come into the light of knowledge'. Now, if it were really true that I could not judge that this rose is withered unless in fact a complete analysis would exhibit grounds in this sense for the predicate, the result would be most important. But I cannot see the least reason to believe it. Surely the sole and sufficient reason for saying that this rose is withered is not the grounds which we do not see but the brown colour and shrunken shape that we do see.

We are further told that in false judgments the predicate is necessitated by the subject + certain subjective conditions, but not by the subject alone. This simply makes confusion worse confounded. If S be not in fact P it is obvious that P cannot be necessitated by S whether alone or combined with subjective conditions. What is necessitated, if we accept the law of causation, is some one's belief in P. But (a) in the case of the true judgment it was P itself and not the belief in P which was supposed to be necessitated. And (b) since, even in the case of true judgments the belief in P is not the same as P itself, this belief is presumably necessitated, if at all, by conditions some of which are subjective. And I should say that in the true judgment about the rose the conditions that necessitate P (if it be necessitated at all) are not even a part of the conditions that necessitate the belief in P. The whole theory in fact seems to me to be a mass of confusion into which it is hardly worth while to penetrate further.

Judgments, we are told, if true at all, are timeless, and true for all men, even though their subject-matter be an historical event. And again some judgments are genuinely universal in the usual sense. It is the business of ontology to provide such a theory of space and time as shall allow of these facts being possible.

Cap. viii. on the Universal and the Individual seems to me to be very good and the best in the book. It is an attack on nominalism and conceptualism and a defence of realism concerning universals. The negative part is clear and conclusive, but Prof. Lossky does not stop there. He argues that, whilst it is very difficult to grasp the higher universals because they are present in nearly everything, it is equally difficult to grasp the genuinely particular. In ordinary perception what we become aware of is the universal of moderately high order. No doubt what is actually before us is a particular individual, but what we discriminate is only enough to distinguish it from its immediate surroundings and not from all other things. This seems to me to be true and important. Again he says that it is no objection to realism that universals must be in several places at once; this is simply a fact and ontology must give such an account of space as shall be compatible with it.

The ninth chapter discusses the Elementary Methods of Knowledge. Lossky recommends his theory as the only one capable of

giving a plausible account of induction. His criticism of Mill's theory of induction is excellent and conclusive, and his view that Mill's methods presuppose another form of induction is obviously sound. According to him direct induction is the immediate recognition of a connexion between universals, which is given in concrete objects of experience, and of course holds always and everywhere if it holds at all. I should very much like to believe that this is true; and I will go so far as to say that, unless something of the sort be true, induction is logically indefensible. Still there are grave difficulties and I doubt whether Lossky succeeds in meeting them. The sort of difficulty that I feel is this. There certainly are cases that fall under Lossky's scheme. Examples of two things and two things making four things gradually lead me to recognise that the universals 2, 4, and multiplication are so connected that $2 \times 2 = 4$. And this is certainly not a mere probable generalisation, but the recognition of a necessary connexion between universals. My difficulty is that with regard to any natural law we never seem to arrive at this kind of knowledge or anything like it. It is after all a kind of certainty that does not allow of degrees; one either has it altogether or not at all. If Lossky's theory of induction be true one would suppose that some natural laws at least would have acquired the kind of certainty possessed by $2 \times 2 = 4$ or by "whatever is coloured is extended." And this does not seem to be true.

Lossky admits and emphasises the difficulty of being sure that one has got hold of a law in its pure form, and expresses doubts whether even so-called axioms are beyond criticism as at present stated. It remains to be seen whether such a theory of induction could be worked out in detail; it is certainly worth while to try.

Perhaps enough has now been said to show that the book is well worth reading. The critical part seems to me to be always good, the constructive part is interesting as far as it goes, but it seems to me never to go far enough and always to underrate the difficulty of the problems which it so confidently solves. The book would make an excellent text-book for students, if accompanied by lectures which went into further detail and pointed out that philosophical problems are seldom so easy to solve as the author would have us believe.

C. D. BROAD.

Totem and Taboo: Resemblances between the Psychic Lives of Savages and Neurotics. By Prof. SIGMUND FREUD, LL.D. Authorised English translation with Introduction by A. A. BRILL, Ph.B., M.D. Kegan Paul. Pp. 256. 10s. 6d. net.

PROF. FREUD has turned his astonishingly fertile and ingenious mind to a new problem. Dr. Rivers has pointed out some years ago points of affinity between dreams and the myths of primitive peoples. Now Prof. Freud comes forward with a far more ambi-